Problemos 98 (2020)

Authors
Andrei Mărăşoiu
University of Bucharest
Abstract
Alter elaborates and defends an ambitious argument advanced by Chalmers against physicalism. As Alter notes, the argument is valid. But I will argue that not all its premises are true. In particular, it is false that all physical truths are purely structural. In denying this, I focus not on the objects of pure physical theory but on the homely, macroscopic objects of our daily lives.
Keywords the structure and dynamics argument   physicalism   dualism   thought-experiments   a priori entailment   explanatory gap
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,683
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Gaps and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Foerster - 2019 - Dissertation, Cornell University
Introspection and Materialism.Mstislav Kazakov - 2017 - Filosofiâ I Kosmologiâ 18:138-152.
Turning the Zombie on its Head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.
The Modal Argument Improved.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):629-639.
The Overdetermination Argument Revisited.Agustín Vicente - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):331-47.
Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-10-24

Total views
18 ( #594,699 of 2,462,462 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #144,304 of 2,462,462 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes