What Does the Zombie Argument Prove?

Acta Analytica:1-10 (forthcoming)

Miklós Márton
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences
In this paper, I argue that the first and the third premises of the zombie argument cannot be jointly true: zombies are either inconceivable beings or the possible existence of them does not threaten the physicalist standpoint. The tenability of the premises in question depends on how we understand the concept of a zombie. In the paper, I examine three popular candidates to this concept, namely zombies are creatures who lack consciousness, but are identical to us in their functional organization, entire physical makeup, and microphysical structure. The main aim of the paper is to argue that none of these conceptions conveys a consistent zombie-concept to us, which, at the same time, would be dangerous for physicalism. In the conclusion, I argue that the source of this failure can be found in the logical fallaciousness of the argument, namely the premises simply presuppose the truth of the conclusion.
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-018-0373-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Body Problem.Barbara Montero - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):183-200.
Are Absent Qualia Impossible?Ned Block - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.
Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1991 - Noûs 25 (4):553-561.

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