Kantian Review 24 (2):316-322 (2019)

Pablo Muchnik
Emerson College
Laura Papish’s new book comes in the wake of a series of studies of Kant’s conception of evil. Two features distinguish her approach: its emphasis on the connection between evil and self-deception (chapters 1–5), and its attentiveness to the role of self-cognition in moral reform (chapters 6–8). Lucidly written and conversant with recent debates in social and moral psychology, Papish’s book expands the range of topics that typically worry Kantians. Its most important contribution is perhaps to have shown that self-deception and self-cognition are countervailing concepts, which together shed light on the neglected, epistemic dimension of Kant’s practical philosophy. My review will adopt the three-part structure of the book indicated in its title.
Keywords evil  self-deception  self-knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1369415419000104
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Laura Papish. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform. Oxford, Reino Unido: Oxford University. 280 p. [REVIEW]Noelia Eva Quiroga - 2018 - Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 7 (13):287-292.


Added to PP index

Total views
34 ( #309,750 of 2,432,313 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #55,754 of 2,432,313 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes