Does the Quine/Duhem Thesis Prevent Us from Defining Analyticity? On Fallacy in Quine

Erkenntnis 48 (1):81 - 99 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy -- particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5).

Similar books and articles

A Quinean definition of synonymy.Peter Pagin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (1):7-32.
Quine's "Strictly Vegetarian" Analyticity.Lieven Decock - 2017 - The Monist 100 (2):288-310.
From within and from without. Two perspectives on analytic sentences.Olaf L. Müller - 2002 - In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
Observation.Bredo C. Johnsen - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Gilbert Harman (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 333–349.
Quine on analyticity and logical truth.James F. Harris - 1969 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):249-255.
Why the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Statements?Henri Lauener - 1993 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 1:131-141.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
172 (#116,905)

6 months
67 (#78,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Olaf L. Müller
Humboldt University, Berlin

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references