Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (3):397-425 (1991)

Robert Muehlmann
University of Western Ontario
My purpose herein is to demonstrate that Berkeley's only use of the argument from perceptual relativity (APR), in both of his major works, is ad hominem, that he uses it to undermine what he calls materialism. Specifically, I show that Berkeley does not use APR to conclude that sensible qualities are mind-dependent; rather he uses APR only to conclude that they are not in material substances; and that his real argument for the former is a quite different one: the heat-pain identification argument
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/hph.1991.0073
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,735
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Semantics of Sense Perception in Berkeley.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (3):249-268.
Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind.Phillip Cummins - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (December):202-214.
Berkeley's Argument From Perceptual Relativity.Stephen Harris - 1997 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (1):99 - 120.
Two Concepts of Perceptual Relativity.Russell B. Goodman - 1976 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-52.
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy.David Berman - 2005 - Thoemmes Continuum.
Is Seeing Believing?David Hilbert - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:446 - 453.
Berkeley on Immediate Perception: Once More Unto the Breach.Georges Dicker - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):517–535.


Added to PP index

Total views
36 ( #291,371 of 2,432,439 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #295,116 of 2,432,439 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes