Backward-looking rationality and the unity of practical reason

In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press (2011)

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Two Notions of Intentional Action? Solving a Puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention.Lucy Campbell - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (3):578-602.

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