Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance

Philosophical Studies 170 (3):377-394 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.

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Author Profiles

Ryan Muldoon
State University of New York, Buffalo
Carlo Martini
Tilburg University
Chiara Lisciandra
Tilburg University
1 more

References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
The Idea of Justice.Amartya Kumar Sen - 2009 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

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