Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism

Synthese 192 (1):67-78 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise

Similar books and articles

Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
Intra-Group Disagreement and Conciliationism.Nathan Sheff - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 90-102.
The epistemology of moral disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.
Peer-Disagreement about Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.
Who is an epistemic peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-09-03

Downloads
1,248 (#10,508)

6 months
145 (#30,575)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Mulligan
Georgetown University

References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.

View all 28 references / Add more references