Kierkegaard and natural reason

Faith and Philosophy 26 (1):42-63 (2009)
In this paper I consider Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous attack on natural theology with respect to how it lines up with Catholic thought on that topic. I argue that Kierkegaard’s recently shown similarities to accounts of basic beliefs raise an interesting question when a Catholic hybrid of basic beliefs and natural theology, which I develop in the paper, is considered. Kierkegaard does not attack what we might call natural reason, or a natural awareness of God’s existence, only natural theology’s demonstrative capabilities, and his reasons for doing the latter, in our current epistemological climate, are shown to be mistaken
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil20092613
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Brian Davies (2009). Is God Beyond Reason? Philosophical Investigations 32 (4):338-359.
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