Philosophia 37 (1):109-112 (2009)
I have argued that to say qualia are epiphenomenal is to say a world without qualia would be physically identical to a world with qualia. Dan Cavedon-Taylor has offered an alternative interpretation of the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism according to which qualia cause beliefs and those beliefs can and do cause changes to the physical world. I argue that neither of these options works for the qualia epiphenomenalist and thus that theory faces far more serious difficulties than has previously been recognized.
|Keywords||Qualia Epiphenomenalism Causation Frank Jackson|
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References found in this work BETA
Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
Citations of this work BETA
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):397-418.
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