Segregation That No One Seeks

Philosophy of Science 79 (1):38-62 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demon- strate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this, and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states amongst agents of the same type. This is quite di erent from Schelling-like behavior, and sug- gests (in his terms) that segregation is an instance of macro behavior which can arise from a wide variety of micro motives.

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Author Profiles

Michael Weisberg
University of Pennsylvania
Ryan Muldoon
University at Buffalo

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References found in this work

Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.
The Robust Volterra Principle.Michael Weisberg & Kenneth Reisman - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):106-131.
Robust simulations.Ryan Muldoon - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):873-883.

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