A new argument against compatibilism

Analysis (1):ant095 (2013)
Abstract
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powersTherefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1093/analys/ant095
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Powers, Non‐Consent and Freedom.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):136-152.
Powers, Necessity, and Determinism.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.

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