Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):215-25 (1999)
This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we take disposition ascriptions to be functional characterizations of properties, then we can explain all that was appealing about the new alternative without the unacceptable consequences
|Keywords||Intentionality Logic Physicalism Martin, C Mellor, D H|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Blackwell.
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