Philosophy 75 (2):265-282 (2000)
A theory of laws is developed that takes from E. J. Lowe the claim of natural laws being consistent with certain classes of exceptions. Neither abnormal cases, such as albino ravens, nor miracles falsify covering laws. This suggests that law statements cannot have the form of a universally quantified conditional. Lowe takes it that this is best explained by natural laws having normative force in the same way as moral laws and laws of the land. I argue that there is a non-normative, descriptivist account that also explains the exception cases and which is preferable, given our reservations about normative laws of nature. I also suggest an improved account of miracles within the descriptivist account
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A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis' Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):73 - 94.
A Challenge for Lowe and Ellis’ Differentiation of Kinds as Substantive Universals.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):73-94.
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