Abstract

In the first part of the dissertation I provide a critique of the cosmopolitan view of international distributive justice as being incomplete in its overall explanation of a possible system of global redistribution. I find that the arguments for such a cosmopolitan system of redistribution do not provide the appropriate justifications for global distributive justice. I especially find it difficult, given the extensive nature of international pluralism, to arrive at a set of principles of international distributive justice that everyone would accept as fair and impartial. I agree that there is a level of international interdependence that requires a system of international distributive justice. Yet, I argue that this interdependence does not give rise to a basic structure which would be able sustain a robust political structure. ;Yet, it is the interdependence of nations and the fact that there is enough of a rudimentary basic structure that necessitates a system of global redistribution that is fair and impartial. I argue that in order to establish a system of international distributive justice there need to be three levels of argumentation and a principle of international redistribution that has a specific goal or cut off point. Like cosmopolitans, my argument is centered on the individual as the primary holder of rights and obligations. Unlike some cosmopolitan thinkers, I also argue that the nation state is necessary to bring about this global redistribution