Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props

Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198 (2019)
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Abstract

Recently, a cottage industry has formed with the expressed intent of analyzing the nature of personal-level reasoning and inference. The dominant position in the extant philosophical literature is that reasoning consists in rule-governed operations over propositional attitudes. In addition, it is widely assumed that our attitude updating procedures are purely cognitive. Any non-cognitive activity performed in service of updating our attitudes is external to the updating process—at least in terms of rational evaluation. In this paper, I argue that whether one has rationally updated one’s attitudes and whether the resultant attitudes are rational can depend on one’s interactions with one’s environment and body to scaffold one’s ability to arrive at attitudes that are rationally appropriate given one’s evidence.

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Wade Munroe
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Reasoning, Rationality, and Representation.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8323-8345.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.

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