Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198 (2019)

Authors
Wade Munroe
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Recently, a cottage industry has formed with the expressed intent of analyzing the nature of personal-level reasoning and inference. The dominant position in the extant philosophical literature is that reasoning consists in rule-governed operations over propositional attitudes. In addition, it is widely assumed that our attitude updating procedures are purely cognitive. Any non-cognitive activity performed in service of updating our attitudes is external to the updating process—at least in terms of rational evaluation. In this paper, I argue that whether one has rationally updated one’s attitudes and whether the resultant attitudes are rational can depend on one’s interactions with one’s environment and body to scaffold one’s ability to arrive at attitudes that are rationally appropriate given one’s evidence.
Keywords Reasoning  Embodied Cognition  Rationality
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ISBN(s) 2168-9105
DOI 10.11612/resphil.1777
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References found in this work BETA

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? [REVIEW]Kim Sterelny - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reasoning, Rationality, and Representation.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8323-8345.

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