Economics and Philosophy:1-22 (forthcoming)

Daniel Muñoz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Why should be ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modeled as the result of complexity, not context-relativity.
Keywords transitivity  value  essentially comparative view  internal aspects view  nontransitive betterness  Repugnant Conclusion  person-affecting principles  multidimensionality  Condorcet's Paradox  majority rule
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267122000074
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

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