Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

Authors
Daniel Muñoz
Monash University
Abstract
Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it isn’t for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.
Keywords consequentializing  consequentialism  deontology  teleology  action theory  normative ethics  killing and letting die  doing and allowing
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References found in this work BETA

The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.
Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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