Wronging Oneself

Journal of Philosophy 121 (4):181-207 (2024)
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When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. We argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples; it explains and unifies them. The key to Symmetry is not, as critics have supposed, the bizarre claim that we must literally give ourselves consent if we are to avoid wronging ourselves. Instead, it is that we authorize ourselves simply by making decisions, just as we can authorize others by making decisions jointly.

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Author Profiles

Daniel Muñoz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt
Center for Advanced Studies, Berlin: Human Abilities & Freie Universität Berlin

Citations of this work

Supererogation and the Limits of Reasons.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt & Daniel Munoz - 2023 - In David Heyd (ed.), Handbook of Supererogation. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 165-180.
What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
World Poverty and Human Rights.Thomas Pogge - 2002 - Ethics and International Affairs 19 (1):1-7.

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