Conservative deflationism?

Philosophical Studies:1-15 (forthcoming)
Authors
Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
Lorenzo Rossi
University of Salzburg
Abstract
Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, 1998; Ketland in Mind 108:69–94, 1999). We consider two defences of conservative deflationism, respectively proposed by Waxman :429–463, 2017) and Tennant :551–582, 2002), and argue that they are both unsuccessful. In Waxman’s hands, deflationists are committed either to a non-purely expressive notion of truth, or to a conception of mathematics that does not allow them to justifiably exclude non-conservative theories of truth. Tennant’s conservative deflationism fares no better: if deflationist truth must be conservative over arithmetic, it can be shown to collapse into a non-conservative variety of deflationism.
Keywords Conservativeness  Delfationism  Arithmetic  Isaacson's Thesis  Reflection principles
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1193-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,062
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
Reflecting on Incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.Hartry Field - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
Deflationism Beyond Arithmetic.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1045-1069.
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
DEFLATIONARY TRUTH: CONSERVATIVITY OR LOGICALITY?Henri Galinon - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):268-274.
Beth's Theorem and Deflationism.Timothy Bays - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
The Innocence of Truth.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):61-85.
Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 59-77.
Truth: The Deflationary Theory Vs. The Semantic Theory.Glen Adam Hoffmann - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
Deflationary Truth and Pathologies.Cezary Cieśliński - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):325-337.
Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-15

Total views
11 ( #529,053 of 2,312,945 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #55,526 of 2,312,945 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature