Generalized Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177 (2020)
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Abstract

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

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Author Profiles

Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
Lorenzo Rossi
Università di Torino

Citations of this work

Ordinal Type Theory.Jan Plate - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed?Lucas Rosenblatt - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):388-407.
Paradoxicality Without Paradox.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1347-1366.
Naïve validity.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2017 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):819-841.

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References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.

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