Generalized Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177 (2020)
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Abstract

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

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Author Profiles

Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
Lorenzo Rossi
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Paradoxicality Without Paradox.Lucas Rosenblatt - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
Classical Recapture and Maximality.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1951-1970.
Should the Non‐Classical Logician Be Embarrassed?Lucas Rosenblatt - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):388-407.
Naïve Validity.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2017 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):819-841.

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References found in this work

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Oxford University Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.

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