Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):165-183 (2013)

Authors
Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
Florian Steinberger
Birkbeck, University of London
Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of logical knowledge as a species of propositional knowledge instead. In this paper, we propose a dispositional account that is more general than the one Besson considers, viz. one that does not merely apply to beliefs, and claim that dispositionalists have the resources to account for reasoned change in view. We then raise what we take to be more serious challenges for the dispositionalist view, and sketch some lines of response dispositionalists might offer
Keywords Logical knowledge  Change in view  Dispositions  Blameless but blind reasoning  Propositional knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0063-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,639
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):391-415.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Dispositional Knowledge-How Versus Propositional Knowledge-That.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 278-295.
Structural Properties.Alexander Bird - 2003 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 155-68.
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge.Steven Yalowitz - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):249-278.
The Likeness of Lawlikeness.James H. Fetzer - 1974 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974:377 - 391.
Logical Reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
Logical Knowledge and Ordinary Reasoning.Corine Besson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):59-82.
Dispositional Properties.David Weissman - 1965 - Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Platonic Recollection and Mental Pregnancy.Glenn Rawson - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):137-155.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-12-20

Total views
91 ( #101,345 of 2,331,233 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #69,773 of 2,331,233 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes