Inferentialism without Verificationism: Reply to Prawitz

In Emiliano Ippoliti & Carlo Cellucci (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 285-90 (2011)
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Abstract

I discuss Prawitz’s claim that a non-reliabilist answer to the question “What is a proof?” compels us to reject the standard Bolzano-Tarski account of validity, andto account for the meaning of a sentence in broadly verificationist terms. I sketch what I take to be a possible way of resisting Prawitz’s claim---one that concedes the anti-reliabilist assumption from which Prawitz’s argument proceeds.

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Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg

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References found in this work

Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Stockholm, Sweden: Dover Publications.
The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
Blind Reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.
Tonk, Plonk and Plink.Nuel Belnap - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):130-134.

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