International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):395 – 413 (2007)
This article shows that Held's central philosophical concern is with the manner in which the withdrawal of world is apparent in kairological moments disclosed in fundamental moods. The phenomenology of world is for him a way of overcoming voluntarist nominalism. World is of its nature a limit to will and is experienced in the passivity of being acted upon. It is shown how Held emphasizes the common origins of philosophy and politics in the fundamental moods of wonder and awe. In the final section it is argued - with reference to his more recent encounter with theological and scriptural themes - that Held's understanding of kairos and doxa is one-sided. By failing to account for the biblical transformation of both terms, especially St Paul's conception of the kairos as a suspension of world and by equating the Judaeo-Christian God with its voluntaristic conception, Held fails to give sufficient weight to the singularity of the kairos in the kenotic humbling of will implicit in the Christian notions of creation and incarnation.
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References found in this work BETA
The Human Condition: Second Edition.Hannah Arendt & Margaret Canovan - 1998 - University of Chicago Press.
The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans.Giorgio Agamben - 2005 - Stanford University Press.
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