Topoi 31 (1):17-26 (2012)
I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic
|Keywords||Manifestability Semantic anti-realism Basic Revisionary Argument Paradox of Knowability|
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