Topoi 31 (1):17-26 (2012)

Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic
Keywords Manifestability  Semantic anti-realism  Basic Revisionary Argument  Paradox of Knowability
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-011-9106-7
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

More Reflections on Consequence.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):223-258.
Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.

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