Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):268-275 (2016)

Authors
Samuel Murray
Duke University
Abstract
Timothy O’Connor has recently defended a version of libertarianism that has significant advantages over similar accounts. One of these is an argument that secures indeterminism on the basis of an argument that shows how causal determinism threatens agency in virtue of the nature of the causal relation involved in free acts. In this paper, I argue that while it does turn out that free acts are not causally determined on O’Connor’s view, this fact is merely stipulative and the argument that he presents for this conclusion begs the question.
Keywords Indeterminism  Agent Causation  Agency  Causation  Free Action
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2016.1194450
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References found in this work BETA

A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Action and Purpose.Richard Taylor - 1966 - New York: Humanities Press.
Freedom and Action.Roderick Chisholm - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.

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