On Fodor's analogy: Why psychology is like philosophy of science after all

Mind and Language 21 (5):553-564 (2006)
Abstract
Jerry Fodor has argued that a modular mind must include central systems responsible for updating beliefs, and has defended this position by appealing to shared properties of belief fixation and scientific confirmation. Peter Carruthers and Stephen Pinker have attacked this analogy between science and ordinary inference. I examine their arguments and show that they fail. This does not show that Fodor's more general position is correct
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00291.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.
Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (4):518-529.
Cognitive Individualism and the Child as Scientist Program.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):518-529.

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