On Heck's New Liar

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):258-269 (2012)
Authors
Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg
Abstract
Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that (versions of) these principles cannot be consistently retained once the structural rule of contraction is restricted. I suggest that revisionary logicians have independent reasons for restricting such a rule
Keywords Liar Paradox  Curry Paradox  Structural Contraction  Linear Logic
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.24
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Truth Without Contra(di)Ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.

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More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.

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