Paradox and Logical Revision. A Short Introduction

Topoi 34 (1):7-14 (2015)
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Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by restricting some classical rules. Our modest aim in this note is to briefly introduce the main strands of the current debate on paradox and logical revision, and point to some of the potential challenges revisionary approaches might face, with reference to the nine contributions to the present volume.For a recent introduction to non-classical theories of truth and other semantic notions, see the excellent Beall a ..



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Author Profiles

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua
Julien Murzi
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Paradoxes and contemporary logic.Andrea Cantini - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Classicality Lost: K3 and LP after the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):43-53.
A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.

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References found in this work

Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.

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