Probability and the Logic of de Finetti's Trievents
In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Bruno de Finetti Radical Probabilist. College Publications. pp. 201--242 (2009)
Today philosophical discussion on indicative conditionals is dominated by the so called Lewis Triviality Results, according to which, tehere is no binary connective '-->' (let alone truth-functional) such that the probability of p --> q equals the probability of q conditionally on p, so that P(p --> q)= P(q|p). This tenet, that suggests that conditonals lack truth-values, has been challenged in 1991 by Goodman et al. who show that using a suitable three-valued logic the above equation may be restored. In this paper it is first analysed a long neglected paper by Bruno de Finetti, written in 1935, where the essentials of Goodman's theory was clearly outlined. It is also stressed that de Finetti anticipated Kleene's as well as Bochvar and Blamey ideas. In the second part of the paper it is argued that the de Finetti-Goodman's original theory is defective and leads to absurd results. However, a new semantics, called semantics of hypervaluations, is here defined, that avoids the defects of the original theory. This appears to be a powerful challenge to Lewis Triviality results and to the thesis by which conditionals lack truth-values as well.
|Keywords||de Finetti conditionals Probability of Conditionals tri-events trievents Logic of conditionals|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables.J. Baratgin, D. Over & G. Politzer - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84.
Similar books and articles
The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
Conditionals, Probability, and Non-Triviality.Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
Probability, Logic, and Probability Logic.Alan Hájek - 2001 - In Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell. pp. 362--384.
The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.
A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.
Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 1.
De Finetti Was Right: Probability Does Not Exist.Robert F. Nau - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):89-124.
De Finetti's Earliest Works on the Foundations of Probability.Jan von Plato - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):263 - 282.
Conditionals and Consequences.Gregory Wheeler, Henry E. Kyburg & Choh Man Teng - 2007 - Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4):638-650.
The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-10-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?