Reliability and Two Kinds of Epistemic Justification

In Newton Garver Peter H. Hare (ed.), Naturalism and Rationality. Buffalo: Prometheus Press. pp. 159-170 (1987)

Murray Clarke
Concordia University
In this paper, I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic justification: one is objective and the other, subjective. Internalists are interested in the subjective variety of justification. Externalists are interested in the objective notion of justification. A paper by Stewart Cohen fails to distinguish these two varieties of epistemic justification and, as a result, criticizes externalists for failing to address the internalist, subjective notion of epistemic justification. But, since that notion is not the one that externallists care about, I argue that his evil demon example fails to be a counterexample against externalists.
Keywords evil demon example  epistemic internalism  epistemic externalism
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Epistemic Norms and Evolutionary Success.Murray Clarke - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):231 - 244.

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