The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22 (2012)

Authors
Dominic Murphy
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms
Keywords Delusion  Folk psychology  Belief
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DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Delusions as Harmful Malfunctioning Beliefs.Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:561-573.

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