The harmful dysfunction analysis of mental disorder

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of mental disorder recently advanced by Jerome Wakefield. Wakefield suggests that mental disorders are most aptly conceived as "harmful dysfunctions" involving two distinct and separable components: the failure of the mechanism in the person to perform a natural function for which the mechanism was designed by natural selection, and a value judgment that the dysfunction is undesirable.

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Author Profiles

Robert Woolfolk
Rutgers University, New Brunswick
Dominic Murphy
University of Sydney

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