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Abstract
My goal in this paper is to point out that whatever difficulty evolutionary reductions have in capturing the normativity essential to moral talk, rational reductions face the same problem. My paper is arranged in two parts. In the first, I distinguish between rational and evolutionary reductions of morality, and highlight the basic normativity problem for evolutionists1. In the second, I offer a tu quoque against rationalists.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 978-1-63435-038-9
DOI 10.5840/wcp23201812365
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