A Theory of Names and True Intensionality

In Maria Aloni, V. Kimmelman, Floris Roelofsen, G. Weidman Sassoon, Katrin Schulz & M. Westera (eds.), Logic, Language and Meaning: 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer. pp. 441-449 (2012)

Abstract

Standard approaches to proper names, based on Kripke's views, hold that the semantic values of expressions are (set-theoretic) functions from possible worlds to extensions and that names are rigid designators, i.e.\ that their values are \emph{constant} functions from worlds to entities. The difficulties with these approaches are well-known and in this paper we develop an alternative. Based on earlier work on a higher order logic that is \emph{truly intensional} in the sense that it does not validate the axiom scheme of Extensionality, we develop a simple theory of names in which Kripke's intuitions concerning rigidity are accounted for, but the more unpalatable consequences of standard implementations of his theory are avoided. The logic uses Frege's distinction between sense and reference and while it accepts the rigidity of names it rejects the view that names have direct reference. Names have constant denotations across possible worlds, but the semantic value of a name is not determined by its denotation.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-08-26

Downloads
270 (#41,644)

6 months
25 (#35,686)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Reinhard Muskens
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
Word and Object.Henry W. Johnstone - 1961 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (1):115-116.
Ueber Sinn Und Bedeutung (Summary).Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Philosophical Review 1 (5):574-575.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Names and Obstinate Rigidity.Brendan Murday - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):224-242.
From Causality to Rigidity.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2009 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 8:75-93.
Are Proper Names Rigid Designators?Pierre Baumann - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):333-346.
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
Causality, Referring, and Proper Names.David S. Schwarz - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
Proper Names and Relational Modality.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Gluer - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
Who’s Afraid of the Predicate Theory of Names?Stefano Predelli - 2015 - Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (4):363-376.
Are Names Ambiguous?Tim Kenyon - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:148-159.
Geach on Proper Names.David Boersema - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
Rigid Designation.Hugh S. Chandler - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (13):363-369.