Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672 (2013)
Abstract
Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representations one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation.
Keywords self-consciousness  consciousness  nonconceptual content  unarticulated constituents  immunity to error through misidentification  perception
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8
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References found in this work BETA
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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Citations of this work BETA
Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Arnon Cahen & Kristina Musholt - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.

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