Mori Victor
Oxford University
The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line of argument shows that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a theory of concepts.Las objeciones fodorianas en contra de una Semántica del Papel Inferencial pueden concebirse como incluyendo un ‘Reto de la Analiticidad’ y un ‘Reto de la Circularidad’, los cuales son principalmente retos a las explicaciones que SPI proporciona sobre la posesión de conceptos. En este artículo presento las teorías del papel inferencial, examino críticamente estos retos y señalo dos malentendidos a los cuales están expuestos. A continuación, presento con detalle una versión racionalista de SPI y defiendo que esta versión supera los retos fodorianos directamente. Si es correcta, esta línea argumentativa muestra que no hay un problema de principio en la consideración de SPI como una buena candidata para una teoría de los conceptos.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI 10.1387/theoria.1881
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