Color and the duplication assumption

Synthese 129 (1):61-77 (2001)
Erik Myin
University of Antwerp
  Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due not only to motor factors, but to the basic physicalasymmetry between black and white. I then argue that the case can be extendedfrom lightness perception to hue perception. Overall, the aims of this paper are:(1) to extend Susan Hurley''s critique of the Duplication Assumption; (2) to argueagainst highly constrained versions of Inverted Spectrum arguments; (3) to proposea broader conception of the vehicle for color perception
Keywords Color  Consciousness  Duplication  Information  Metaphysics  Perception  Hurley, S
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1012647207838
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Neural Plasticity and Consciousness.Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
Looks as Powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
Qualia Compression.Lieven Decock & Igor Douven - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
Why Don't Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away?Dave Ward - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.

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