REC: Just Radical Enough

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Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):61-71 (2015)
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Abstract

We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.

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10.1515/slgr-2015-0020

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Author Profiles

Daniel D. Hutto
University of Wollongong
Erik Myin
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

An exploration into enactive forms of forgetting.Marta Caravà - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):703-722.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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