Daniel D. Hutto
University of Wollongong
We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.
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DOI 10.1515/slgr-2015-0020
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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An exploration into enactive forms of forgetting.Marta Caravà - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):703-722.

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