Action as the Conclusion of Practical Reasoning; The Critique of a Rödlian Account

Authors
Abstract
In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning's practicality and its rationality in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account—an account which grants Rödl's central theses—fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo-Aristotelian accounts alike.
Keywords practical reasoning  Sebastian Rödl  practical rationality  conclusion of practical reasoning  neo-Aristotelianism  practical reason  philosophy of action
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12175
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,077
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
How We Know What We're Doing.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-24.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
Knowledge in Intention.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):21-44.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-24

Total views
33 ( #205,357 of 2,312,953 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #121,849 of 2,312,953 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature