A cognitive account of agentive awareness

Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563 (2017)
Authors
Myrto Mylopoulos
Carleton University
Abstract
Agentive awareness is one's awareness of oneself as presently acting. Dominant accounts in cognitive science consider agentive awareness to be grounded in the states and processes underlying sensorimotor control. In this paper, I raise concerns for this approach and develop an alternative. Broadly, in the approach I defend, one is agentively aware in the virtue of intending to act. I further argue that agentive awareness is not constituted by intentions themselves but rather first-personal thoughts that are formed on the basis of them. I develop this proposal, highlight some of its theoretical advantages, and show how it successfully meets various challenges.
Keywords action  agentive awareness  consciousness  phenomenology  sense of agency
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12158
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Conceptions of the Self.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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