Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563 (2017)
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| Abstract |
Agentive awareness is one's awareness of oneself as presently acting. Dominant accounts in cognitive science consider agentive awareness to be grounded in the states and processes underlying sensorimotor control. In this paper, I raise concerns for this approach and develop an alternative. Broadly, in the approach I defend, one is agentively aware in the virtue of intending to act. I further argue that agentive awareness is not constituted by intentions themselves but rather first-personal thoughts that are formed on the basis of them. I develop this proposal, highlight some of its theoretical advantages, and show how it successfully meets various challenges.
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| Keywords | action agentive awareness consciousness phenomenology sense of agency |
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| DOI | 10.1111/mila.12158 |
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (4):603.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
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