The Sophisticated and Naive View of Moral Experience

Philosophies 8 (4):72 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper, I draw a contrast between two ways of posing the question of moral experience: the episodic and the contemplative. On the first, the episodic outlook, the question of moral experience is the question of specifying the workings of a capacity (or set of capacities) whose exercise may ground claims of moral knowledge. On the contemplative outlook, on the other hand, the question of understanding moral experience is the question of articulating a standpoint: the moral standpoint. On this view, philosophical reflection on moral experience aims to shed light on the human experiences that paradigmatically exemplify and, thus, best reveal the moral standpoint. In the tradition of contemplative accounts, I propose that some of the human experiences that paradigmatically exemplify and reveal the moral standpoint are experiences of “moral growth and change”. Finally, I argue that in “moral growth and change”, one is in view of the world as what is at stake. This leads to a different sense in which moral experience grounds knowledge claims.

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References found in this work

The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1971 - Religious Studies 8 (2):180-181.
Needs, Values, Truth.David Wiggins - 1987 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (1):106-106.
Epiphanies: An Ethics of Experience.Sophie Grace Chappell - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perceptual Intuitionism.Robert Cowan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Moral knowledge by perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.

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