Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?

Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272 (2011)
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Abstract

Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theory

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Myrto Mylopoulos
Carleton University

Citations of this work

Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.

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References found in this work

All consciousness is perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
Control Consciousness.Pete Mandik - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.

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