Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?
Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272 (2011)
Abstract
Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theoryAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01136.x
My notes
Similar books and articles
The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception.Rick Grush - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):377-396.
A neuropsychological approach to motor control and imagery.Barbara Tomasino, Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua, Alessia Tessari, Caterina Spiezio & Raffaella Ida Rumiati - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):419-419.
Visual Imagery and Consciousness.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2009 - In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness.
Mental simulation and motor imagery.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):161-80.
Time matters! Implications from mentally imaged motor actions.Markus Raab & Marc Boschker - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):208-209.
Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption.Gregg Caruso - 2005 - In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
Imagery, consciousness, and cognitive control: The boss model reviewed.P. J. Hampson & P. E. Morris - 1990 - In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.
Consciousness and control: Not identical twins.Bernhard Hommel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.
Amodal imagery in rostral premotor areas.Takashi Hanakawa, Manabu Honda & Mark Hallett - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):406-407.
The false dichotomy of imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):211-211.
The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and self-sustainment.J. Scott Jordan & Marcello Ghin - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-03-10
Downloads
141 (#90,551)
6 months
1 (#448,894)
2011-03-10
Downloads
141 (#90,551)
6 months
1 (#448,894)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Agentive awareness is not sensory awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
References found in this work
Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Andrew Woodfield - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):210-214.
All consciousness is perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.