Noûs 55 (2):245-269 (2021)

Authors
Oded Na'aman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions.
Keywords Emotion  Rationality  Fittingness  Processes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12304
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The fitting resolution of anger.Oded Na’Aman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2417-2430.
On the Rationality of Emotion Regulation.Alison Duncan Kerr - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):453-473.
A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge:
What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Logic of Comprehensive or Deep Emotional Change.Jeremy Barris - 2017 - Continental Philosophy Review 50 (4):429-452.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.
Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):475-487.
What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
Living Slow and Being Moral.Nan Zhu, Skyler T. Hawk & Lei Chang - 2018 - Human Nature 29 (2):186-209.
Are There Process-Requirements of Rationality?Julian Fink - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (4):475-488.
Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality.Jarrett Leplin - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):31-51.
Commitment and Change of View.Isaac Levi - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press. pp. 209--232.
The Social Amplification View of Facial Expression.Trip Glazer - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (2):33.
Emotion and Reason.Pei-Yuan Meng - 2001 - Philosophy and Culture 28 (11):1019-1033.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-07-10

Total views
204 ( #49,713 of 2,444,728 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #16,854 of 2,444,728 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes