Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet

New York: Oxford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.

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