Cognitive Science 44 (8) (2020)

Authors
Shaun Nichols
Cornell University
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University
Thomas Nadelhoffer
College of Charleston
1 more
Abstract
The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.
Keywords compatibilism  incompatibilism  determinism  intrusion  free will  folk metaphysics
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DOI 10.1111/cogs.12873
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References found in this work BETA

The Weirdest People in the World?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

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Citations of this work BETA

Who's Afraid of Cognitive Diversity?Miguel Egler - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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