Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586 (2006)

Authors
Thomas Nadelhoffer
College of Charleston
Abstract
According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the 'Simple View', intending to x is necessary for intentionally x-ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the ordinary concept of intentional action is concerned, an agent need not intend to x in order to x intentionally
Keywords INTENTIONAL ACTION   MORAL RESPONSIBILITY   ORDINARY LANGUAGE   FOLK PSYCHOLOGY   FREE WILL   INTUITIONS   JUDGMENT
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00292.x
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.

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