Beyond circularity and normativity: Measurement and progress in behavioral economics

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290 (2010)
This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions
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DOI 10.1177/0048393109335329
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