Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):265-290 (2010)

Authors
Michiru Nagatsu
University of Helsinki
Abstract
This article assesses two major conceptual arguments against theories of choice.The first argument concerns the circularity of belief-desire psychology, on which decision theory is based. The second argument concerns the normativity arising from the concept of rationality. Each argument is evaluated against experimental practice in economics and psychology, and it is concluded that both arguments fail to establish their skeptical conclusion that there can be no science of intentional human actions
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DOI 10.1177/0048393109335329
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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Experimental Philosophy of Economics.Michiru Nagatsu - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.

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