Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem

Philosophy 73 (285):337-52 (1998)

Authors
Thomas Nagel
New York University
Abstract
Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- must be an illusion. But the denial of this contingency should not take the form of a reductionist account of consciousness of the usual type, whereby the logical gap between the mental and the physical is closed by conceptual analysis -- in effect, by analyzing the mental in terms of the physical
Keywords Epistemology  Functionalism  Intuition  Mind-body  Reason
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819198000035
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Consciousness and Space.C. Mcginn - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):220-230.

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