Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich


Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto at Mississauga
Abstract
Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of their evidential value. I argue that existing work on cross-cultural variation in mindreading favors my position over Stich’s.
Keywords epistemic intuitions  mindreading  disagreement  cross-cultural variation  universality  evidence  philosophical method
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12008
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References found in this work BETA

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.

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Citations of this work BETA

Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
Why the Method of Cases Doesn’T Work.Christopher Suhler - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Colorado

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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